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Experimental games and climate coalitions

The theoretical and empirical analysis of how networks and groups form and interact is relevant to many different aspects characterizing the functioning of social and economic systems. Just to provide some examples: the management of international public goods, the governance of economic unions, the formation of industrial cartels and collaborations, the patterns of racial integration or the endogenous evolution and structure of institutions. Indeed, the last two decades have witnessed a huge academic commitment in this direction, especially within the disciplines of economics, game theory and behavioural sciences in general.

In the field of climate change mitigation in particular, a growing interest in social and economic networks has been fostered by recent developments in the analysis of strategic network formation benefiting  from an increasing methodological cross fertilization with earlier work on the formation of large networks, developed in mechanical physics.

In this short interview granted to Re3, Alessandro Tavoni from The Grantham Research Institute of the London School Economics, gives practical examples on how, for instance, experimental games can be integrated into more traditional lines of research on coalition formation and stability.

If you are interested or dealing yourself with these and similar issues, note that the leading international scholars dealing with the theoretical and empirical analysis of socio-economic networks and groups will gather at FEEM’s premises in Venice for the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the Coalition Theory Network on 19-20 March 2015.

The call for papers is open until December 15th, 2014. Find out more here.

This article first appeared on Re3: http://re3.feem.it/getpage.aspx?id=6943